Touro Law Review
Volume 37

Number 2

Article 20

2021

Does Due Process Have an Age Limit? Why the Law Concerning
the Parental Right to Freedom of Intimate Association in the
Relationship with an Adult Child Is a Mischaracterization of a
Circuit Split
Bryan Schenkman
Touro Law Center

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Fourteenth Amendment Commons, and the Supreme Court
of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Schenkman, Bryan (2021) "Does Due Process Have an Age Limit? Why the Law Concerning the Parental
Right to Freedom of Intimate Association in the Relationship with an Adult Child Is a Mischaracterization
of a Circuit Split," Touro Law Review: Vol. 37: No. 2, Article 20.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss2/20

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For
more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.

Schenkman: Does Due Process Have an Age Limit?

DOES DUE PROCESS HAVE AN AGE LIMIT? WHY THE LAW
CONCERNING THE PARENTAL RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF
INTIMATE ASSOCIATION IN THE RELATIONSHIP WITH AN ADULT
CHILD IS A MISCHARACTERIZATION OF A CIRCUIT SPLIT
Bryan Schenkman*
I.

INTRODUCTION

It would not be an understatement to acknowledge the
profound impact that the formation and preservation of deep
interpersonal relationships can have in shaping an individual's
morals, values, knowledge, life choices, and overall happiness.1
Generally, the relationship between a parent, or a parental figure, and
a child, is one of the most influential relationships in a person's life. 2
Typically, the parent-child relationship will commence at birth,
continue throughout the years the child is considered a minor, and
remain long after the child reaches the age of majority. 3 However,
throughout the entire existence of the relationship, the nature of the
parent-child relationship will naturally evolve as the child ages.
From the moment of birth through the age of minority, a child will

* Bryan M. Schenkman is a recent graduate of Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg
Law Center and former Managing Editor of the Touro Law Review. He dedicates
this Note to his grandmother, Rhoda Damsky, who passed away while he was in
the process of drafting this Note.
1
Debra Umberson, and Jennifer Karas Montez, Social Relationships and Health: A
Flashpoint for Health Policy, JOURNAL OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, vol.
51, no. 1 suppl., 54 (2010).
2
Eleanor Maccoby, Parenting and its Effects on Children: On Reading and
Misreading Behavior Genetics, Volume 51, ANNUAL REVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGY, 3
(2000).
3
Kira Birditt, ET AL., Tensions in the Parent and Adult Child Relationship: Links to
Solidarity
and
Ambivalence,
PSYCHOL
AGING,
2
(2009),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2690709/pdf/nihms-94367.pdf.
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generally be reliant on a parent for nurture, guidance, and care.4
Gradually, the relationship evolves as the child ages and becomes
less reliant on the parents or parental figures.5 However, while the
relationship between a parent and a minor child may be inherently
different from the relationship between a parent and an adult child,
should it also be presumed that the strength of the bond and level of
intimacy in the parent-child relationship changes as well? Currently,
it would appear as though the law is divisive on the answer to that
question.
It would not be far-fetched to characterize the issue of
whether the relationship between a parent and an adult child should
be afforded constitutional protection under the right to freedom of
intimate association, as "a circuit split." While the United States
Supreme Court has previously found that the right to freedom of
intimate association affords parents a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in the relationship with their children, Supreme Court
precedent is limited to cases involving the relationship between a
parent and a minor child. 6 Indeed, a case involving the question of
whether a parent has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the
relationship with an adult child would present a novel issue at the
Supreme Court level. Yet, although there is a lack of Supreme Court
precedent, several circuits in the United States Circuit Courts of
Appeal have decided the issue of whether the relationship between a
parent and an adult child is entitled to constitutional protection.
While the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have found that the right
to freedom of intimate association affords parents a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in the relationship with their adult children,7
4

Romana Kaleem, Towards the Recognition of a Parental Right of Companionship
in Adult Children Under the Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process
Clause, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1121, 1146-48 (2005).
5
Id.
6
See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that the due
process clause protects parents’ right to raise their children “establish a home”);
Stanley v. Illinois 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (holding that parents have the
fundamental right to companionship with their children and to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children); Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (discussing that parents have a “fundamental
constitutionally protected liberty interest in the care, custody, control and
management of their children.”).
7
See, e.g., Patel v. Searles, 305 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2002); Smith v. City of
Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir. 1983) overruled on other grounds by
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the First, Third, Seventh, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits,
have yet to find that a parent was deprived of a cognizable
constitutionally protected liberty interest in cases where the child was
an adult.8
Indeed, based on the decisions by the United States Circuit
Courts of Appeals, it would appear that the circuits disagree as to
whether a parental liberty interest exists in relationships between
parents and adult children. Yet, even in the absence of Supreme
Court precedent, it is apparent, based upon Supreme Court's
interpretation of the right to freedom of intimate association, and the
Fourteenth Amendment, that a child's age should not be a dispositive
factor nor even a consideration, in determining whether a parent-child
relationship should be entitled to receive constitutional protection.
Additionally, based on the decisions of the United States Circuit
Courts of Appeals, the lack of uniformity among the circuits as to
whether a parent has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the
relationship with an adult child is a mischaracterization of a circuit
split. In other words, the purported circuit split is not the result of
divergent opinions among the circuits as to whether a parental liberty
interest in the relationship with an adult child exists.
The First, Third, Seventh, Eleventh and District of Columbia
Circuits' findings that the parents did not suffer an unconstitutional
deprivation of their right to freedom of intimate association was not
due to the child's age, barring the existence of a parental liberty
interest. Rather, it is due to the fact that state actors' conduct did not
rise to the level of an unconstitutional deprivation.9 However, even
Hodgers-Durgin v. d la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1041 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999); Trujillo v.
Bd. of Comm’rs of Santa Fe Cty., 768 F.2d 1186, 1188-91 (10th Cir. 1985).
8
See, e.g., Ortiz v. Burgos, 807 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1986); McCurdy v. Dodd, 352
F.3d 820, 830-31 (3d Cir. 2003); Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 791 (7th Cir. 2005);
Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 656 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Robertson v.
Hecksel, 420 F.3d 1254, 1259 (11th Cir. 2005).
9
See Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 10 (holding that the court would not extend a due process
violation from a “government action directly aimed at the relationship between a
parent and young child to an incidental deprivation” the relationship between a
parent and an adult child); see also McCurdy, 352 F.3d at 830 (holding in part
that,“[it] would stretch the concept of due process too far if we were to recognize a
constitutional violation based on official actions that were not directed at the
parent-child relationship.); Russ, 414 F.3d at 790 (holding that a finding of a
constitutional violation based on official actions that were not directed at the
parent-child relationship would “stretch the concept of due process far beyond the
guiding principles set forth by the Supreme Court.”).
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the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits would have likely reached that
same conclusion under those circumstances.10 Thus, while on its
face, it appears that there exists a circuit split as to whether a child's
age bars a parent from having a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in the relationship with his or her child, no circuit has
actually found that a parental liberty interest does not exist based
solely on the child's age. 11 Therefore, based on the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the right to freedom of intimate association, and the
decisions of each of the circuits, a child's age should not be a factor in
determining whether a relationship is entitled to constitutional
protection and the purported lack of consensus among the United
States Circuit Courts of Appeals is a mischaracterization of a circuit
split.
This Note argues that, based on the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the right to freedom of intimate association, and the
decisions of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals, a child's age
should not be a dispositive factor in determining the existence of a
constitutionally protected parental liberty interest, and the purported
lack of consensus among the circuits is a mischaracterization of a
circuit split. This Note proposes that in cases involving the question
of whether parents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
the relationship with their children, the United States Supreme Court
and the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals have based their
decisions on the strength of the bond in their relationship rather than
the child’s age. The author describes how the Supreme Court has
interpreted the right to freedom of intimate association and how the
decisions of each of the circuits have adhered to the Supreme Court's
interpretation, while also remaining consistent with one another
irrespective of the fact that the cases at the circuit court level resulted
in different outcomes.
10

See Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1190 (holding in part that a finding of an
unconstitutional deprivation is appropriate only if the state actor’s conduct was
directed at that right); Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro Police Dep’t, 159 F.3d 365,
373 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that there was no violation of the plaintiffs’ right to
freedom of intimate association when the police officers accidentally shot and
killed the plaintiffs’ adult son and brother); Gorman v. Rensselaer County, 910
F.3d 40, 48 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding that a claim under the Due Process Clause for
infringement of the right to familial associations requires the allegation that state
action was specifically intended to interfere with the family relationship).
11
See Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 10; McCurdy, 352 F.3d at 830; Robertson, 420 F.3d at
1258; Butera, 235 F.3d at 656.
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Section II provides an overview of the right to freedom of
intimate association and its application in a federal action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
Section III explores the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the right to freedom of intimate association. In
Section IV, the author analyzes the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the right to freedom of intimate association,and evaluates how the
Supreme Court would decide a case involving the question of
whether a parent has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in a
relationship with an adult child. Section V reviews the cases and the
decisions of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals, addressing
the question of whether a parental right to freedom of intimate
association exists in the relationship with an adult child. The author
will conclude in Section VI, that based on the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the right to freedom of intimate association, and the
decisions of each of the circuits, a child's age should not be a factor in
determining whether a relationship is entitled to constitutional
protection, and the purported lack of uniformity between the circuits
is
mischaracterized as a circuit split as a careful analysis
demonstrates that there actually is uniformity among the circuits on
this question.
II.

OVERVIEW OF THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF INTIMATE
ASSOCIATION AND ITS APPLICATION IN AN ACTION UNDER
42 U.S.C. § 1983

The right to freedom of intimate association is a “fundamental
liberty interest” that is guaranteed and afforded protection to all
citizens of the United States under the Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution.12 Specifically, the “right to freedom of
intimate association protects an individual's right to enter into and
maintain certain kinds of highly personal relationships from
unwarranted state interference.”13 While the right to freedom of
intimate association is not expressly enumerated nor recognized as a
fundamental right under the United States Constitution,14 the United
States Supreme Court recognized that since “individuals draw much
of their emotional enrichment from close ties to others, an
individual's freedom and choice to maintain and enter into
12

Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619.
Id. at 620.
14
Id.
13
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relationships” is a fundamental liberty interest guaranteed to all
citizens and protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution.15 Significantly, the Supreme Court recognized that an
individual liberty interest arises from an ability to “freely associate
and maintain deep personal relationships with others.”16 The basis
behind the Court’s reasoning was that the ability to associate and
maintain personal relationships not only facilitates societal
interaction, but also has an immense impact on shaping an
individual's beliefs, values, morals, knowledge, and understanding of
not just society, but themselves as well.17 As a result, since deep
interpersonal relationships have a profound impact on shaping an
individual’s identity, an individual who is not afforded the freedom to
enter into and maintain such relationships will essentially have no
control over who he or she will become. Thus, it is the ability of an
individual to associate with others and form deep personal
relationships is what gives rise to the existence of the fundamental
liberty interest.18
As a constitutionally protected liberty interest, an individual's
right to freedom of intimate association is afforded constitutional
protection against unwarranted state interference under the Due
Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution which states that, "[n]o state shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.”19 In order to hold the states
accountable, and ensure the protection of an individual's
constitutionally protected rights and liberties, federal law, under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, provides individuals who were unjustly deprived of a
constitutionally protected right or liberty a remedy for relief by
imposing liability on state actors whose actions result in an
unconstitutional deprivation an individual of a constitutionally
protected right or liberty.20 Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states that:
[e]very person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
15

Id.
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 619.
19
U.S. CONST. amend XIV §1.
20
42 U.S.C. §1983 (2019).
16
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or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any
action brought against a judicial officer for an act or
omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief
was unavailable.21
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must satisfy two elements
to succeed in an action against a state actor for conduct that
unconstitutional deprives the plaintiff of his or her constitutionally
protected right or liberty interest. 22 First, the plaintiff, a United States
citizen, must demonstrate that he or she possessed, and suffered a
deprivation of, a cognizable constitutionally protected right or liberty
interest.23 Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate he or she was
unconstitutionally deprived of that constitutionally protected right by
a state actor, who was acting in his or her capacity as a state actor, at
the time of unconstitutional deprivation. 24 In other words, in order
for a plaintiff to satisfy the second prong, a mere demonstration of a
deprivation of a constitutionally protected right or liberty interest by a
state actor is insufficient. Instead, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
the state actor unconstitutionally deprived the plaintiff of his or her
constitutionally protected right or liberty interest. 25 Thus, in cases
involving an alleged violation of the right to freedom of intimate
association, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that a state actor's

21

Id.
Robertson, 420 F.3d at 1258.
23
See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999).
24
See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986).
25
Id., see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998)
(discussing that “conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any
government interest is the sort of official action most likely to rise to the
conscience-shocking level sufficient to constitute a due process violation).
22
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conduct impeded the plaintiff's ability to enter into and maintain a
highly personal relationship. 26
Additionally, to satisfy the second element, the plaintiff must
prove that the state actor was sufficiently culpable in order for the
state actor's conduct to rise to the level of an unconstitutional
deprivation.27 In such a case, the plaintiff must prove that the “state
actor intentionally directed his or her conduct at the plaintiff's
constitutionally protected relationship.”28
Accordingly, mere
negligence, or conduct that only incidentally results in a deprivation
of a constitutionally protected relationship on the part of a state actor,
is insufficient to satisfy the second element and constitute an
intentional deprivation on the part of a state actor. 29 Thus, even if the
plaintiff can demonstrate that a state actor's conduct deprived the
plaintiff of a constitutionally protected relationship, the plaintiff
would not be able to prevail in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if
the conduct “negligently or incidentally deprived the plaintiff” of his
or her right to freedom of intimate association. 30
III.

THE SUPREME COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT TO
FREEDOM OF INTIMATE ASSOCIATION

While the Supreme Court has yet to hear a case involving the
existence of a parental liberty interest in the relationship with an adult
child, the Court has provided guidance on its interpretation of the
right to freedom of intimate association. First, the Supreme Court
has recognized the right to freedom of intimate association to be a
fundamental liberty interest afforded protection to all citizens of the
United States under the due process clause of the Constitution. 31
While the right to freedom of intimate association is not expressly
enumerated as a fundamental right under the United States
26

See Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1190; Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 10; Gorman, 910 F.3d at 48;
McCurdy, 352 F.3d at 828.
27
See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 (holding that mere negligence by a state actor does
constitute a deprivation under the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution).
28
Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1190.
29
See, e.g., Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331; Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849; Trujillo, 768 F.2d at
1190; Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 10; Gorman, 910 F.3d at 48.
30
See, e.g., Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331; Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849; Trujillo, 768 F.2d at
1190; Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 10; Gorman, 910 F.3d at 48; Russ, 414 F.3d at 790.
31
See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619
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Constitution, the Supreme Court has interpreted the word “liberty” to
encompass other rights not enumerated in the Constitution, that have
been deemed to be “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” and
“deeply rooted in our nation’s history and traditions.”32
In determining whether a right, not expressly enumerated in
the Constitution, is considered to be fundamental and warrant
constitutional protection, the Supreme Court has historically based its
determination on whether the purported right is deep rooted in our
nation’s history and tradition.
As a result, the Supreme Court recognized the right to
freedom of intimate association to be a fundamental liberty interest,
finding an individual’s ability to freely associate, and enter into deep
intimate relationships with others to be deeply rooted in United
States’ history and tradition. In fact, in determining whether a
relationship is entitled to constitutional protection under the right to
freedom of intimate association, the Supreme Court does not limit
constitutional protection based on the type of relationship or the
status of a relationship.33
Instead, the Supreme Court only takes into account the
objective characteristics of a relationship to determine whether the
relationship is sufficiently intimate to warrant constitutional
protection and deeply rooted in our nation’s history and tradition such
to give rise to the individual liberty interest that warrants affording
constitutional protection.34 As a result, the Supreme Court has
recognized a wide range of rights and liberties, in a variety of
intimate relationships that it has considered to be deeply rooted in the
United States’ history and tradition and thus, fall within the scope of
constitutional protection under the right to freedom of intimate
association.35 Examples include the right to marry,36 the right to keep
32

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled on other grounds by Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784 (1969)); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977).
33
See Roberts, 486 U.S. at 620.
34
Id. at 619.
35
See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620; see also Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 (recognizing
unwed father’s right to companionship with his child); Loving v. Virginia 388 U.S.
1, 12 (1967) (holding that the freedom to marry was a constitutionally protected
liberty interest); see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 745, 753
(1982) (discussing that the right to freedom of intimate association was not limited
to relationships between “members of the nuclear family” and “the tradition of
uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household along with
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the family together,37 the right of companionship, 38 the right to raise
one’s child,39 and the right of custody over one’s child.40
The Court’s broad recognition of the different human
relationships that may fall within constitutional protection is because
of the highly personal nature of the bond formed in a relationship that
gives rise to creation of an individual's liberty interest that
necessitates affording a relationship constitutional protection under
the right to freedom of intimate association. 41 As a result, the
objective characteristics the Supreme Court considers to be relevant
are "relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to
begin and maintain affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical
aspects of the relationship.”42 Thus, in regard to the types of
relationships that would qualify to receive constitutional protection
under the right to freedom of intimate association, the Supreme Court
has “never felt the need to mark areas of this terrain with any
precision,”43 and has only limited constitutional protection if a
relationship does not demonstrate the objective characteristics. 44
IV.

HOW THE SUPREME COURT WOULD EVALUATE A CASE
INVOLVING THE EXISTENCE OF A PARENTAL LIBERTY
INTEREST IN THE RELATIONSHIP WITH AN ADULT CHILD

While the Supreme Court has yet to hear a case regarding the
issue of whether the right to freedom of intimate association exists in
a relationship between a parent and an adult child, it is clear that,
based on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the right to freedom of
intimate association, a child's age alone should not be considered a
dispositive factor, or even a consideration, in determining if a
parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally deserving of
constitutional recognition.”).
36
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015).
37
See Moore, 431 U.S. at 753.
38
See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.
39
See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57
(2000).
40
See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651.
41
Id. at 620.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 619.
44
See Roberts, 486 U.S. at 620.
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relationship should be entitled to constitutional protection. The
Supreme Court has made clear that the right to freedom of intimate
association exists, and is afforded constitutional protection, because
highly personal relationships, by nature, “give rise to the formation of
a personal liberty interest” that necessitates affording a relationship
with constitutional protection.45 Therefore, the right to freedom of
intimate association exists due to the fact that highly personal
relationships give rise to individual liberty.46 As a result, if our nation
were to adopt a strict limitation and find that a child's age, alone,
without due consideration to the personal nature of the relationship,
bars the existence of a parental liberty interest, it would remove the
very concept of liberty from the question of affording constitutional
protection.
Additionally, in determining whether a relationship is entitled
to receive constitutional protections, the Supreme Court has
historically only considered the objective characteristics of a
relationship that it deems demonstrative of giving rise to individual
liberty to be relevant.47 As a result of the Supreme Court's objective
approach that focuses on whether a relationship gives rise to the
individual liberty interest that entitles a relationship to constitutional
protections, the Supreme Court has afforded constitutional protection
to a broad range of relationships, and does not limit constitutional
protection based on an external characteristic such as a person's age. 48
However, the fact that age should not be considered a
dispositive factor in determining if a relationship should be afforded
constitutional protection does not that age is never a relevant
consideration. Indeed, a child's age may have an impact on the level
of intimacy in a given relationship, if it results in the child no longer
maintaining a close and personal relationship with his or her parent.
However, even in that case, the dispositive factor in the Court’s
determination would still not be based on the age of the child but
rather, the level of intimacy of the relationship itself..
Additionally, while one may view the absence of Supreme
Court recognition of the existence of a constitutionally-protected
parental liberty interest in relationship with an adult child as
indicative of the Supreme Court's view that the relationship would
45

Id. at 619.
See id. at 620.
47
See id. at 620.
48
See id.
46
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not rise requisite level of intimacy necessary to afford it with
constitutional protections, the Supreme Court precedent actually
indicates the opposite. There is far more evidence that the Supreme
Court would support the notion that a relationship between a parent
and an adult child would demonstrate the requisite level of intimacy
necessary to afford it with constitutional protection in the absence of
any contrary or unique circumstances.49 The Supreme Court “has
long recognized the importance of familial relationships.”50 Notably,
the Supreme Court has even acknowledged that familial relationships
“exemplify the objective characteristics” that give rise to the level of
intimacy that warrants affording a relationship with constitutional
protection.51 The court reasoned that familial relationships are
generally characterized by factors such as “as relative smallness,” and
“seclusion from others in the critical aspects of the relationship,
which inherently give rise to individual liberty”52
Furthermore, based on the Supreme Court’s long recognition
and support of familial relationships, it is evident that “standardizing”
the right to freedom of intimate association by finding that an
external characteristic, such as age, bars the existence of a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in the relationship between
two family members would not be supported by the Supreme Court.
For instance, in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,53 the Supreme
Court held that the City of East Cleveland’s housing ordinance,
which contained a definitional section that limited the definition of
“family” to only a few categories of related individuals was
unconstitutional.54 There, the City of East Cleveland passed a
housing ordinance, which limited the occupancy of a dwelling unit to
members of a single family and imposed criminal sanctions on any
person who was found to be in violation of the ordinance. 55
Specifically, the city ordinance limited the definition of a family to
only the nominal head of the household, his or her spouse, the

49

See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620; see also Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 (recognizing
unwed father’s right to companionship with his child); Moore, 431 U.S. at 753.
50
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.
51
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.
52
Id.
53
431 U.S. 494 (1977).
54
Id. at 496.
55
Id.
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unmarried children of the head of household or the spouse, and
parents of the nominal head of the household or the spouse.56
In that case, Ms. Moore resided in an East Cleveland home
with her son, Dale, Sr., and Dale, Sr.’s child, Dale, Jr. Following the
death of Ms. Moore’s daughter, Ms. Moore’s other grandson, John,
came to live with his grandmother, uncle and cousin. 57 The City of
East Cleveland, after discovering that the two grandchildren were
cousins, issued Ms. Moore a notice of violation stating that her
grandson, John, was an illegal occupant and directed her to comply
with the ordinance. 58 After Ms. Moore refused to remove her
grandson from her home, the City filed criminal charges against Ms.
Moore for violating the City’s ordinance. 59 At trial, Ms. Moore was
found guilty of violating the City’s ordinance, and sentenced to five
days in jail and fined twenty-five dollars.60
The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed Ms. Moore’s conviction,
and after the Ohio Supreme Court denied review of her appeal, Ms.
Moore appealed to the Supreme Court contending that the City of
East Cleveland’s ordinance was unconstitutional. 61 The Supreme
Court held in favor of Ms. Moore, finding that the City’s ordinance
violated her constitutional right to live together with her family. 62 In
its decision, the Supreme Court rejected the City’s contention that the
constitutional right to keep the family together should only apply to
members of the nuclear family, finding that such a restriction on a
constitutionally protected liberty interest would force the Court “to
close its eyes to the basic reasons why certain rights associated with
the family are accorded shelter under the Fourteenth Amendments
due process clause.”63
Additionally, the Court reasoned that, although it had not
previously recognized the existence of a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in the relationships between extended family
members, since the Court has “long recogni[zed] that freedom of
personal choice and matters of family life is one of the liberties
56

Id. at 552 n.2.
Id. at 497.
58
Id.
59
Moore, 431 U.S. at 497.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 497-98.
62
Id. at 506.
63
Id. at 501
57
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protected by the due process clause,” any decision to limit
constitutional protection in the context of family rights “at the first
convenient arbitrary boundary” –such as between members of the
nuclear family— would be inconsistent with the Due Process
Clause.64 Instead, the Supreme Court found that the appropriate
limits on due process “come not from drawing arbitrary lines, but
rather from careful respect for the teachings of history.” 65 As a
result, since the Supreme Court has long recognized the importance
of familial relationships and familial relationships are deep rooted in
our nation’s tradition, the constitution prevented the city from
enacting a law that set forth a definition that prevented family
members from exercising their fundamental right to live together. 66
Thus, since the relationship between members of an extended family
demonstrates the close ties and bonds necessary to afford
constitutional protection under the right to freedom of intimate
association, the Supreme Court found that irrespective of the degree
of kinship, the choice of relatives to live together may not lightly be
denied by the state.67
Based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Moore v. City of
East Cleveland that recognized the existence of an extended family
member’s constitutionally protected liberty interest to keep the family
together,68 the Supreme Court would find in favor of the existence of
a parental liberty interest in the relationship between an adult child.
First, as was made clear by the Court’s decision in Moore, due to the
Supreme Court’s long recognition of familial relationships, a mere
lack of Supreme Court precedent does not serve to bar nor imply the
nonexistence of constitutionally protected liberty interest between
two family members. 69 Instead, the Supreme Court’s long recognized
that familial relationships and family life are deeply rooted tradition
of our nation.70 As a result, the Court’s recognition demonstrates that,
even in the absence of Supreme Court precedent, there is an
established presumption that the relationship between two families

64

Moore, 431 U.S. at 501-04.
Id. at 503.
66
Id. at 504.
67
Id. at 505-06.
68
Id. at 506.
69
See Moore, 431 U.S. at 504
70
Id. at 504
65
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members is entitled to constitutional protection in the absence of the
relationship demonstrating any characteristics indicating the contrary.
Second, since the Supreme Court found any arbitrary
boundary imposing a limitation on familial constitutional rights is
inconsistent with the due process clause, 71 it is likely that the
Supreme Court would reject the notion that a bright light standard
based on a child’s age alone would serve to bar the existence of a
parental liberty interest. Third, since the Supreme Court has held that
the constitutional right to keep the family together may not be denied
by the state, any attempt by a state to pass a law that interferes with
that right will be held unconstitutional. 72 Thus, since it is likely that if
a state or local government imposed an ordinance that prevented a
parent and an adult child from living together, the law would likely
be found to be in contravention with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Moore. As a result, the Court has impliedly found that a child’s age
does not bar the existence of a parental liberty interest as any finding
to the contrary would pose an unworkable standard based on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Moore.
The Court has also further acknowledged its support of
affording constitutional protection in familial rights in finding that
"freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life to
be one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”73 Based on the Supreme Court's continued
recognition and support of familial rights, 74 it is evident that the
absence of Supreme Court recognition of a liberty of a parental
liberty interest with an adult child, its lack of recognition should not
be considered to be indicative that Supreme Court would not
recognize a parental liberty interest in the relationship with an adult
child. Instead, it is far more likely that the Supreme Court has not
recognized the existence of a parental liberty interest on grounds that
such a case has never been heard before it. The lack of Supreme
Court guidance should not serve as evidence to support the notion
that the Supreme Court intended to limit the right to relationships
between a parent and a minor child.
Moreover, based on the Supreme Court's long and continued
support of familial rights, in addition to its interpretation of the right
71

Id. at 502.
See id. at 506.
73
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.
74
Id.
72
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to freedom of intimate association, suggests is that the Supreme
Court would support a finding of a parental liberty interest in the
relationship with an adult child. Thus, based on the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the right to intimate association, so long as the
relationship between a parent and an adult child demonstrates the
objective characteristics, such “as relative smallness,” and “seclusion
from others in the critical aspects of the relationship” that have been
recognized by the Supreme Court to give rise to individual liberty.75
V.

A MISCHARACTERIZATION OF A CIRCUIT SPLIT

While it would appear that there exists a split among the
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals as to whether a parent has a
constitutionally-protected liberty interest in the relationship with his
or her adult child, the denotation of a circuit split is actually a
mischaracterization. In other words, although on its face, it would
appear as though the circuits have been divided as to whether a
child's age serves to bar a finding of a parental liberty interest, 76 the
child's age has never been a dispositive factor in the circuit courts'
decisions. For instance, in Russ v. Watts,77the Seventh Circuit
overturned its prior decision, Bell v. City of Milwaukee,78 and found
that the parent of a twenty-two-year-old child did not suffer an
unconstitutional deprivation following a chase and subsequent
altercation with law enforcement that resulted in his son's death. 79
However, the Seventh Circuit's decision to overturn Bell was
not due to an erroneous finding of the existence of cognizable
constitutionally protected parental liberty interest with an adult child.
In Bell, the Seventh Circuit found that the law enforcement officer's
conduct unconstitutionally deprived the father of his right to freedom

75

See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620 (the Court also recognized characteristics also
included “a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the
affiliation, to reflect the considerations that have given rise to the intrinsic element
of personal liberty.”).
76
See, e.g., Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 10; McCurdy, 352 F.3d at 830-31; Russ, 414 F.3d at
791; Butera, 235 F.3d at 656; Robertson, 420 F.3d at 1259; Patel, 305 F.3d at 136;
Smith, 818 F.2d at 1418, overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. d la
Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1041 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999); Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1188-89.
77
414 F.3d at 791.
78
746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1985).
79
Id. at 784.
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of intimate association. 80 There, the father brought an action against
the City of Milwaukee alleging that law enforcement officers
deprived him of his right to maintain the relationship with his twentythree-year-old son after his son, following an altercation with law
enforcement, suffered fatal injuries.81 Indeed, while the facts of Russ
v. Watts are analogous to those of Bell, the Seventh Circuit did not
find the decision in Bell, which found in favor of the existence of the
liberty interest. Instead, the Seventh Circuit overturned Bell because
the Bell court found for the plaintiff in a section 1983 action in the
absence of a state actor intentionally depriving the plaintiff of his
right to liberty.82 Significantly, in Russ, the Seventh Circuit
compared its decision in Bell with the decisions of the other circuits
which decided cases involving a parental liberty interest under the
right to freedom of intimate association. 83 Notably, the Seventh
Circuit acknowledged that the distinction between Bell and the
standard of other circuits was that Bell permitted a parent to prevail
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when the state actor's conduct negligently or
incidentally resulted in the deprivation. 84
The Seventh Circuit also noted a distinct difference between
the standard established in Bell and the Supreme Court's standard and
that “the Supreme Court has recognized violations of the due process
liberty interest in the parent-child relationship only where the state
took action specifically aimed at interfering with that relationship.”85
Thus, in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court, and its sister
circuits, since under any standard, finding a constitutional violation
based on official actions that were not directed at the parent-child
relationship would “stretch the concept of due process far beyond the
guiding principles set forth by the Supreme Court,” the Seventh
Circuit decided to overturn its prior decision Bell.86
However, while the Seventh Circuit overturned Bell, on the
basis that it was too broad in application as it did not require a finding
of intent, the Seventh Circuit made it clear that its decision would
“not establish an absolute rule” that would bar the existence of a
80

Id. at 1239.
Id. at 1215.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 791.
84
Id. at 788.
85
Id. at 788 (quoting Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331).
86
Id. at 790.
81
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parental liberty interest in the relationship with an adult child. 87 As a
result, the Seventh Circuit's decision to overturn Bell was not the
result of an erroneous finding of the existence of a parental liberty
interest in the relationship with an adult child, but Bell’s allowing a
plaintiff to recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the absence of an
intentional deprivation by a state actor.88 Thus, while a parental
liberty interest in the relationship with an adult child no longer exists
in the Seventh Circuit, it is clear that the reason is not due to the
child's age or a different standard than its sister circuits and the
Supreme Court.89
Yet, arguably, even circuits which have recognized the
existence of a constitutionally protected parental liberty interest with
an adult child, would have reached the same conclusion as the
Seventh Circuit, in Russ, under those circumstances. For instance, in
Trujillo v. Board of Commissioners of Santa Fe County,90 the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the judgment of the United States District Court for
the District of New Mexico, which dismissed the plaintiffs’ action for
a failure to allege a constitutionally protected right that would entitle
the plaintiffs to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 91 There, the plaintiffs,
the mother and sister of the deceased, brought an action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the wrongful death of their adult son and
brother deprived them of their right to freedom of intimate
association.92
The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiffs both “had a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in the relationship with their
son and brother.”93 In its decision, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged
the Supreme Court’s broad recognition of liberty interests in familial
relationships94 and how such relationships, “by their nature, involve
87

Russ, 414 F.3d at 791.
Id.
89
Id.
90
768 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir 1985).
91
Id. at 1187.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 1189.
94
See, e.g., Moore, 431 U.S. 494 (holding that a zoning ordinance could not
prohibit a grandmother from living with her grandsons who are cousins); Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (holding that foster parents
have a liberty interest in the relationship with foster children); Roberts, 468 U.S. at
619 (holding that freedom of intimate association protects associational choice as
well as biological connection).
88
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deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other
individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of
thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctly personal aspects
of one's life.”95 Based on the Supreme Court’s broad recognition of
the existence of constitutionally protected liberty interests in familial
relationships, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that both the mother and the
sister had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in their
relationships with the deceased. 96
However, while the Tenth Circuit held that the mother and
sister had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in their
relationship with the deceased, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
judgment of the District Court, and dismissed the action for the
plaintiffs’ failure to include an allegation of the state actor’s intent in
their complaint demonstrating that the state actor possessed the level
of intent necessary to give rise to an unconstitutional deprivation
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.97 In its decision, the Tenth Circuit rejected
the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Bell, believing that the Seventh
Circuit’s decision was inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent as,
“their [the Seventh Circuit’s] rationale would permit a section 1983
claim by a parent whose child is negligently killed in an automobile
accident with a state official” but would not permit a plaintiff, who is
not an immediate family member, to recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
when a state actor deliberately acted to deprive the plaintiff of his or
her right to freedom of intimate association. 98 As a result, the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District Court of
the District of New Mexico, and dismissed the plaintiffs’ action
finding that a state actor’s conduct will rise to the level of an
unconstitutional deprivation of an individual’s right to freedom of
intimate association under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “only if the state actor’s
conduct was directed at that right.”99
Thus, while the Tenth Circuit found that, based on Supreme
Court’s broad recognition of the existence of constitutionally
protected liberty interests in familial relationships, the mother and
sister had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the
relationship with their adult son and brother, the Tenth Circuit found
95

Id. at 1188 (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619).
Id. at 1188-89.
97
Id. at 1191.
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Id.
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Id.
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the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Bell to be inconsistent with Supreme
Court precedent for imposing a bright line limitation on the types of
relationships that would be entitled to receive constitutional
protection.100 Additionally, the Tenth Circuit also rejected the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Bell, since it permitted a plaintiff to
recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the absence of a state actor
demonstrating the requisite level of intent, deemed to give rise to an
unconstitutional deprivation under Supreme Court precedent. 101
Therefore, while a parental right to freedom of intimate association
does not exist in the Seventh Circuit, the decision to overturn Bell v.
City of Milwaukee, is not due to a circuit split as to whether a parental
liberty interest exists in the relationship with an adult child, but rather
that the Seventh Circuit’s decision overturned a standard that was not
only inconsistent with the precedent of other circuits, but also with
that of the Supreme Court.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Based on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the right to
freedom of intimate association, and the decisions of each of the
circuits, a child's age should not be a factor for determining whether a
relationship is entitled to constitutional protection, and the purported
lack of uniformity among the circuits is a mischaracterization of a
circuit split.
Based on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the right to
freedom of intimate association, a child’s age should not be
considered a dispositive factor in determining the existence of a
parental liberty interest. While the relationship between a parent and
an adult child may be inherently different from the relationship
between a parent and a minor child, 102 there is no disputing that the
relationship between a parent and an adult child is a familial
relationship. Significantly, the Supreme Court has long recognized
the importance of familial relationships, and has continuously
afforded constitutional protection in cases involving the question of
whether a relationship between family members is entitled to
constitutional protection under the right to freedom of intimate

100

Id.
Id.
102
Romana Kaleem, supra note 4, at 1146-48.
101
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association.103 This is due to the fact that the Supreme Court has
found the inherent nature of relationship between family members to
exhibit the objective characteristics that it has deemed to give rise to
the requisite level of intimacy necessary to warrant constitutional
protection.104
Furthermore, since the relationship between a parent and an
adult child is a familial relationship, the mere fact that the Supreme
Court has yet to hear a case involving existence of a parental liberty
interest in the relationship with an adult child should not bar the
existence of such a right. The Supreme Court has consistently held
that when right or liberty interest is considered to be fundamental, it
is entitled to the constitutional protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 105 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court has also found that a right is fundamental when it is considered
to be deeply rooted in our nation’s history and traditions.106
Significantly, the Supreme Court has found that familial relationships
are deeply rooted in our nation’s history and tradition.107 Thus, since
the relationship between a parent and an adult child is a familial
relationship, deeply rooted in our nation’s history and tradition, the
only basis to deny the existence of a parental liberty interest with an
adult child would be the mere fact that the Supreme Court has yet to
hear a case involving a child over the age of majority. Yet, such a
reason to deny the recognition of a parental liberty interest in the
relationship with an adult child would be inconsistent with Supreme
Court precedent as Supreme Court precedent has made it clear that
any decision to limit constitutional protection in the context of
familial rights “at the first convenient arbitrary boundary” would be
inconsistent with the due process clause of the Constitution. 108
While there is a purported “split” amongst the United States
Circuit Courts of Appeal as to whether a parental liberty interest
exists in the relationship with an adult child, the decisions have been
mischaracterized as such. In cases involving the right to freedom of
intimate association between a parent and an adult child, the Second,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits found that the parents had cognizable
103

Moore, 431 U.S. at 501-04.
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constitutionally protected liberty interest, while the First, Third,
Seventh, Eleventh and District of Columbia Circuits did not find that
the parents suffered an unconstitutional deprivation of a cognizable
constitutionally protected liberty interest. 109 As a result, the decisions
of the circuits do not demonstrate a circuit split but rather decisions
that were decided on other grounds based on the specific
circumstances of each case.
However, based on the decisions from each of the circuits, it
appears as though the divergent outcomes amongst the circuits are
due to the fact that the circuits have a different opinion as to whether
parents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the
relationship with their children. While the First, Third, Seventh and
Eleventh and District of Columbia Circuits did not find that the
parents suffered an unconstitutional deprivation of a cognizable
constitutionally protected liberty interest, the decisions were not
based on the child’s age but rather due the fact that the state actor did
not demonstrate the requisite level of intent for the parents to prevail
in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.110 As a result, it does not appear
that the circuits are split on whether a parental liberty interest exists
in the relationship with an adult child.
While the recognition of a constitutionally protected parental
liberty interest in the relationship with an adult child may pose
questions as to how the courts throughout the United States will be
able to adopt a workable standard for determining cases where a state
actor is alleged to have deprived a parent of his or her relationship
with an adult child, it is likely that the answers already exist in
Supreme Court precedent. Indeed, while there are certain parental
liberty interests that are protected under the right to freedom of
intimate association, would not be applicable to the relationship
between a parent and an adult child, 111 it is likely that recognition of a
109

Patel, 305 F.3d at 136; Smith, 818 F.2d at 1418, overruled on other grounds by
Hodgers-Durgin, 199 F.3d at 1041 n.1; Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1188-91; Ortiz, 807
F.2d at 10; McCurdy, 352 F.3d at 830-31; Russ, 414 F.3d at 791; Butera, 235 F.3d
at 656; Robertson, 420 F.3d at 1259.
111

Based on the nature of the relationship between a parent and an adult child it is
likely other parental liberty interests such as the right of a parent to rear his or her
child, the parental right to exercise custody over his or her child, the parental right
to make decisions concerning the care custody and management of a his or her
child, and the parental right to make decisions concerning the care custody and
control of his or her child would not be conducive to the parent-child relationship.
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parental liberty interest in the relationship with an adult child would
be recognized by the Court under the constitutional right to keep the
family together and the parental right of companionship.
Imposing an arbitrary distinction based on a person’s age to
bar the existence of a fundamental liberty interest that is deep-rooted
in our nation’s tradition would only serve to bar individual liberty.
Thus, not only would the recognition of a parental liberty interest in
the relationship with an adult child be consistent with the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the right to freedom of intimate association,
but it would serve to ensure that our nation’s laws, and constitutional
rights, would reflect our nation’s values and traditions. The
recognition of the right to freedom of intimate association in the
relationship between a parent and an adult child would not only serve
to reflect our nation’s history and traditions, but the very concept of
liberty itself.
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